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R&D projects face significant organizational challenges, especially when the different
units who run these projects compete among each other for resources. In such cases,
information sharing among the different units is critical, but it cannot be taken for
granted. Instead, individual units need to be incentivized to not only exert effort
in evaluating their projects, but also to truthfully reveal their findings. The for-
mer requires an emphasis on individual performance, while the latter relies on the
existence of a common goal across the organization. Motivated by this commonly
observed tension, we address the following question: how should a firm balance
individual and shared incentives, so that vital information is both acquired, and
equally importantly, disseminated to the entire organization? Our model captures
two key characteristics of R&D experimentation: information is imperfect and it is
also costly. Our analysis yields several important implications for the design of such
incentive schemes and the management of R&D portfolios.
Key words: new product development, resource allocation processes, product eval-
uation, incentives, R&D portfolio
1 Introduction
Launching new products has always been a daunting task even for the most successful orga-
nizations. Scholars early on highlighted that given the high uncertainty embedded in such
projects, identifying the “winners” upfront is rather unlikely, and as such, committing substan-
tial resources early on may not always be the most prudent strategy. Instead, scholars suggest
that a firm should engage in parallel pursuits, and refine its resource allocation decisions as
more information becomes available (Nelson, 1961). A parallel search approach allows a firm
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to explore a much broader set of ideas (Kornish and Ulrich, 2011), develop a much more ro-
bust and adaptable business strategy (Beinhocker, 1999), and gain a competitive advantage in
environments characterized by unforeseeable uncertainty and complex performance landscapes
(Sommer and Loch, 2004). Despite these indisputable benefits, the management of parallel
projects involves substantial challenges (Sommer et al., 2009). A fundamental one stems from
the fact that these projects often co-exist within a product portfolio, and therefore, compete
with each other for the same scarce resources. This challenge is widespread in companies that
manage parallel projects and is nicely summarized in Sharpe and Keelin (1998, p. 45): “how
do you make good decisions, in a high-risk, technically complex business when the information
you need to make those decisions comes largely from the project champions who are competing
against one another for resources?” This is the primary question we address in this paper.
This question is particularly relevant in industries where tough resource allocation decisions
need to be made. For example, given its skyrocketing costs and its highly uncertain nature, the
pharmaceutical industry has been struggling to improve its decision making processes. Consider
the recent restructuring of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) discussed in Huckman and Strick (2010).
When GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham merged in 2000, the new company announced
the creation of six independent Centers of Excellence for Drug Discovery (CEDD) focused on
different therapeutic areas, a unique concept that sought to bring the entrepreneurial culture
of a biotech R&D to the gigantic new company. If a compound progressed through Phase IIa,
the leadership of the CEDD unit would present the compound to the centralized Development
Investment Board (DIB) which would ultimately decide whether the compound would receive
the substantial resources required to progress to Phase IIb. A key aspect of this restructuring
was the incentive scheme which, in an effort to promote independence and mimic small biotech
companies, offered substantial rewards to scientists and executives for progressing compounds
that originated from their own CEDD. Naturally, this policy raised serious concerns about the
emergence of ferocious competition among the different CEDDs.
A diametrically opposite reward structure was adopted by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals (Huck-
man et al., 2010). The fundamental premise of Wyeth’s restructuring efforts was to motivate
scientists to look beyond their departmental “silos” and strengthen synergies across the var-
ious therapeutic areas, and as such, the bonuses of all eligible scientists in R&D were based
on the degree to which the entire organization achieved its objectives. In general, promoting
such synergies is perceived to be beneficial for organizations, but in the case of running par-
allel projects it is often considered absolutely vital as such shared incentives facilitate better
communication across the organization. This is stressed in Loch et al. (2006, ch. 6) who argue
that the successful implementation of running parallel projects critically relies on the ability
of top management to elicit credible information from their product development teams, and
subsequently disseminate this information to the rest of the organization. This information,
in turn, is the key to efficient resource allocation decisions that strengthen “star” projects and
abandon “flops”. Under this collective reward policy, however, a key concern at Wyeth was
that it failed to reward exceptional achievements by specific project teams.
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The goal of this paper is to understand how a firm should design its incentive schemes
in order to balance these two opposing forces: to incentivize individual project teams to exert
effort to improve the evaluation of their own projects with the need to achieve cooperation and
information sharing across the different project teams. Specifically, and given the information-
intensive nature of such resource allocation decision processes, we address the following question:
how can a firm balance individual and shared incentives, so that its product managers are willing
to acquire the necessary information, and equally importantly, to share it with the rest of the
organization?
It is worth noting that in such highly technical and complex environments as the ones
faced in the pharmaceutical industry, neither the acquisition nor the dissemination of reliable
information can be dictated by traditional top-down management approaches. As Sharpe and
Keelin (1998) explain, traditional top-down approaches are ineffective because no single exec-
utive could know enough about the highly complex projects that the company is considering.
Moreover, even the most sophisticated quantitative approaches have limited value given that it
is impossible for senior management to see the “quality of thinking”1 behind those valuations.
As a result, project funding decisions were primarily driven by the advocacy skills of project
champions. The following quote by one of the executives highlights quite vividly his perception
regarding the lack of transparency in the evaluation process: “Figures don’t lie, but liars can
figure.” (Sharpe and Keelin, 1998, p. 46). To capture these two key aspects of the decision-
making process, we develop a game-theoretic model that combines moral hazard ex-ante (at
the information acquisition stage) with adverse selection ex-post (at the information revelation
stage).
Our study makes the following contributions to the existing literature. First, we show
that different types of products require fundamentally different incentive structures. For novel
products that are characterized by a less precise evaluation process, the firm should perfectly
align a unit manager’s compensation with the firm’s overall performance. On the contrary, for
products characterized by a more precise evaluation process, the firm should place a strong
emphasis on individual incentives. Moreover, we find that more precise information leads to
lower pay-performance sensitivity for both individual and shared incentives. As a result, the
total wage of a product manager decreases as the precision of his information increases. The
reason behind this counter-intuitive finding is that, more accurate information leads to a bet-
ter alignment between the managers’ and the firm’s interests, thereby reducing the managers’
information rents.
Second, we show that information asymmetries increase the effective cost of product eval-
uation, and therefore, for a wide range of parameters, the firm under-invests in information
acquisition. Interestingly, for intermediate information acquisition costs and very precise infor-
mation, the same information asymmetries lead the firm to over-invest in information. This
result is driven by the firm’s inability to distinguish informative signals from uninformative
1This term was used by one of the executives in Sharpe and Keelin (1998) to illustrate that senior managers
could not rank these recommendations with respect to their rigor or robustness.
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ones when project managers possess private information. To circumvent these distortions in
their product evaluation processes, many firms decide to outsource the product evaluation to
external providers. Our analysis identifies the critical role of the relative advantage of the in-
house versus the external provider’s evaluation precision in making this decision. In addition,
we characterize the optimal evaluation policy for different information structures. Lastly, while
a number of studies have looked at imperfect product evaluation and product portfolio decisions
in isolation, it remains unclear how the presence of asymmetric information in the former stage
would affect the latter. We find that the presence of asymmetric information results in an overly
broad product portfolio scope, that is, the firm produces too many products, thereby spreading
its resources too thinly.
2 Literature Review
The challenges associated with resource allocation processes have been central in the new prod-
uct development (NPD) literature. A thorough review of this literature can be found in Kavadias
and Chao (2007). Recently, an emerging stream has accounted for the potentially misaligned
preferences in NPD processes (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Siemsen, 2008; Chao et al., 2009; Som-
mer and Loch, 2009; Mihm, 2010; Mihm et al., 2010; Xiao and Xu, 2012) and the reality that
incentive mechanisms play a central role in such processes. The effect of incentive schemes on
the effectiveness of resource allocation processes is more explicitly studied in Chao et al. (2009),
Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2013), and Chao et al. (2013). Chao et al. (2009) compare
a policy in which a senior manager empowers the divisional manager to adapt the innovation
budget to the divisional sales versus a policy in which the senior manager directly controls the
division through a fixed budget. Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2013) characterize optimal
funding decisions across different resource allocation processes such as top-down, bottom-up,
and strategic buckets. Lastly, Chao et al. (2013) study incentive schemes in a stage-gate process
where senior management has to rely on a privately informed project manager in order to make
go/no-go decisions. They emphasize the role of uncertainty regarding the quality of the project
idea, and show how it might make an organization overly conservative in its project selection
process, i.e., projects that would have been profitable do not get approved. We contribute in
the above stream of resource allocation processes by capturing the dynamics arising when mul-
tiple product managers compete for the same resources. All of the aforementioned papers are
concerned with the level of resources allocated to a single product, and as such, they do not
address the challenges associated with managing a portfolio of projects.
Incentives for parallel innovation projects are studied in Ederer (2013). By combining
both a theoretical and experimental analysis, he shows that when workers can freely learn the
best practices from each other, the firm can only incentivize innovation by establishing shared
incentives. This happens because individual pay-for-performance incentive schemes encourage
imitation and free-riding on the successful ideas of others. While we also highlight the impor-
tance of shared incentives for an organization developing new products, our work differs from
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Ederer (2013) in several aspects. Most notably, in our setting the outcome of the product eval-
uation is not public information, and thus, the firm needs to incentivize the managers to reveal
their information truthfully. Another recent stream of work in NPD has studied parallel search
in the context of innovation tournaments (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Kornish and Ulrich, 2011;
Boudreau et al., 2011), but the tradeoffs involved in these settings are considerably different
than the resource allocation decisions within a single firm. As such, despite the extensive dis-
cussion in the NPD community about the necessity of running parallel projects (see Loch et al.,
2006, and references therein) we know very little about how to manage such a process within
the boundaries of the firm.
Our work also touches upon a central question in the capital budgeting literature in corpo-
rate finance. The stream most related to our setting begins with the seminal work of Stein (1997)
which focuses on the role of corporate headquarters in allocating resources among competing
projects. In particular, he compares the efficiency of internal capital markets with respect to the
external ones. In a series of follow-up papers, Bernardo et al. (2001), Stein (2002), and Inderst
and Laux (2005) examine the role of incentives in mitigating agency costs, and specifically, the
potential private benefits that agents enjoy from controlling more capital, thereby reflecting a
preference for “empire building”.
Closer to our work, Friebel and Raith (2010) develop a model in which pay-for-performance
incentives create an endogenous empire building motive, which in turn, might prevent a manager
from truthfully communicating his private information.2 They also show that the firm can
induce truthful communication by using shared incentives, albeit at the expense of additional
information rents. Given these additional information rents, they examine whether the benefit of
integration (namely, the pooling of resources) outweighs the cost of integration (the information
rents), and they derive the conditions under which an integrated firm is more valuable than two
separate firms. Our work differs from Friebel and Raith (2010) in several important ways.
First, we are interested in the allocation of resources in innovation projects where the value of
a project cannot be perfectly known before resources have been allocated to it. In contrast, in
Friebel and Raith (2010) the value of a project is realized before the resource allocation stage.
Second, we model the process of imperfect product evaluation, and as such, the managers in
our model are incentivized to acquire information about the value of the product, rather than
improve the quality of the product (as in Friebel and Raith (2010)). We find that the structure
of the incentive scheme heavily depends on the characteristics of the information source (e.g.,
the information precision). Lastly, our model examines the effect of information asymmetry on
the firm’s product evaluation strategy, and in turn, on the firm’s product portfolio scope. In
contrast, in Friebel and Raith (2010), at equilibrium, resources are always allocated to the most
profitable projects, so information asymmetries do not distort the firm’s product portfolio.
In short, all of the above papers in the capital budgeting literature assume that information
2Recent theoretical literature has also examined the link between the incentive to exert effort and the incentive
to share information in settings where agents work towards a common outcome (public good). For example,
in Campbell et al. (2014) agents do not share information in order to maintain the motivation of their peers,
but this leads to delays and even an over-production of ideas.
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regarding the type of the project is perfect and freely available to the agent, but not to the
principal. On the contrary, in our setting, acquiring reliable information is associated with
substantial costs incurred privately by the agent, and thus, the agent will only exert that effort
if he is incentivized to do so. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper that studies
project selection when the agent is incentivized to acquire costly information is Lambert (1986).
Importantly, Lambert (1986) considers a single-agent setting, and as such, his model does not
address the issues that we discussed earlier regarding competition for resources among parallel
projects.
3 Model Setup
Consider a firm that is faced with the decision of allocating its resources across multiple projects.
The key decision for the firm is whether to choose a narrow product portfolio scope or a broader
one. To capture this tradeoff in a mathematically tractable way, we assume that the firm is
contemplating two projects, and we examine under what conditions the firm decides to allocate
all of its resources in a single project (narrow scope) versus spreading them evenly across both
projects (broad scope). The market value that the firm realizes from each project depends on
two parameters: (i) the inherent market potential of each project, which is uncertain upfront
and can be either good or bad; and (ii) the resources that the firm invests in the project.
The firm seeks to maximize its profits by allocating resources to good projects and forgoing
investments in bad ones.
A central element of our model is the product evaluation stage in which the firm can acquire
costly information regarding each project’s potential. This information is acquired through
extensive experimentation by each project’s respective product manager. Then, upon observing
the outcome of this experimentation process, each product manager makes a recommendation
to the senior management of the firm (from hereon, the firm), and the firm decides on the level
of resources to allocate in each project. For example, in the case of GSK, the head of each R&D
unit (i.e., of each CEDD) would present a compound to the centralized Development Investment
Board, and subsequently, the board members would decide about the progress of the compound
in the next stage (the extremely resource-intensive Phase IIb). Similarly, at Wyeth there was
a centralized Discovery Review Board that was responsible for making funding decisions across
all therapeutic areas. As discussed extensively in the aforementioned examples, the “quality
of thinking” behind such recommendations by the product managers is very hard to verify,
and even less so to contract upon. As such, there can be considerable information asymmetry
between the product managers and the firm.
In our setting, the presence of information asymmetry is reflected both in the “quality
of thinking” as well as in the truthfulness of the recommendation that the product managers
submit to the firm. We model the former by acknowledging that information acquisition (e.g.,
experimentation) is a costly process and can be done at various levels of quality (e.g., robustness
checks may satisfy only some minimum standards, or may be very thorough). In particular, we
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assume that each product manager can choose between a high-effort and a low-effort evaluation
process for his product. The chosen effort level is not observed by the firm because product
evaluation critically relies on a manager’s tacit information gathering and synthesis (e.g., the
time managers spend meeting with people, trying to obtain their tacit knowledge, sitting in
their offices trying to make sense of data, etc.). For the manager, high-effort evaluation comes
with a private cost, while the cost of low-effort evaluation is normalized to zero. The latter form
of information asymmetry aims to capture the fact that not all product managers truthfully
communicate the results of their experimentation, especially when they compete for resources
with one another. In short, our model incorporates ex-ante moral hazard (at the information
acquisition stage) with ex-post adverse selection (at the recommendation stage), and as such, if
the firm desires high-effort product evaluation and truthful recommendations, it has to design
appropriate incentive schemes. Lastly, upon observing the managers’ recommendation, the firm
decides on its resource allocation strategy.
To summarize, the sequence of events is as follows (see Figure 1): (i) The firm announces the
compensation scheme to the product managers; (ii) Each manager chooses his evaluation effort
and incurs the associated private effort costs; (iii) Then, each manager observes a private and
imperfect signal and makes a recommendation to the firm regarding his product’s potential; (iv)
Based on the managers’ recommendations, the firm allocates resources to the products; (v) The
products are launched and their market value is realized. The firm receives the corresponding
payoffs and compensates its managers. In the following three subsections, we explain our
modeling assumptions regarding the above stages in more detail.
Figure 1: Sequence of events.



















The Product Evaluation Stage
New projects carry significant uncertainty regarding their market potential. We capture this
uncertainty by assuming that two ex-ante identical products i and j can either have high
(θi = G) or low (θi = B) market potential.
3 The true potential of each product is unknown to
the firm and its managers, and both states are considered ex-ante equally likely.4 By evaluating
his product, manager i receives an imperfect signal si ∈ {g, b} which indicates whether product
3For notational simplicity, we define explicitly only the parameters for project i. An identical set of parameters
applies for product j as well.
4This assumption is done for expositional clarity and does not affect qualitatively any of our results.
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i has high (si = g) or low (si = b) market potential. In line with prior work on NPD (Loch
et al., 2001; Thomke, 2007), we capture the informativeness of the signal for both products i and
j by the parameter q to which we refer to as signal precision. Mathematically, q represents the
conditional probability that the signal is reflective of the true market potential, i.e., Pr(si =
g|θi = G) = Pr(si = b|θi = B) = q. Importantly, the precision q depends on the chosen
effort level ei which can be high (ei = h) or low (ei = l). High-effort evaluation requires
a cost c > 0 which is privately incurred by the product manager, and results in a signal of
precision q ∈ (12 , 1]. In contrast, low effort is costless for the product manager, but results in
an uninformative signal, i.e., q = 12 .
Upon observing the signal si, manager i revises his prior belief for his product’s market
potential to account for the new information. In particular, since both states are ex-ante equally
likely, the posterior beliefs are given by Pr(θi = G|si = g) = Pr(θi = B|si = b) = q. Then,
manager i submits his recommendation mi ∈ {g, b} about his product’s potential to the firm.
If mi = si, then a manager truthfully reveals his signal. Thus, manager i’s action space is fully
characterized by his product evaluation effort, ei, and his subsequent recommendation, mi.
The Resource Allocation Stage
Once the firm receives the managers’ recommendations, then it has to decide on whether to
allocate all of its resources to a single product or split them evenly between products i and
j. The market value to the firm generated by product i, denoted by νi, depends on both, its
inherent potential θi as well as the amount of resources invested in it. The notation we use to
capture this dependency is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: A product’s market value.
No resources Partial funding All resources
Good product (θi = G) 0 v1 v2
Bad product (θi = B) 0 z1 z2
More specifically, we assume that a product that does not receive any resources for devel-
opment always generates zero market value, regardless of whether it has a good (θi = G) or bad
(θi = B) market potential. In contrast, for products that receive resources, their generated value
increases as more resources are allocated to them because more resources improve a product’s
quality, and thus, its market value. Resources create more value when they are allocated to
products with good market potential. In particular, if the firm splits resources evenly across two
products, then each bad product’s market value is z1 ≥ 0, whereas each good product’s market
value is v1 > z1. If the firm allocates all the resources to a bad product, then this product’s
market value is z2 > z1, and the corresponding value for a good product is v2 > max{v1, z2}.
In short, the above assumptions imply that the firm prefers to allocate its resources to good
rather than bad products, and that more resources lead to products of higher value.
Note that the choice of product portfolio scope becomes a trivial question either if the
firm realizes increasing returns (v2 > 2v1, z2 > 2z1), or if there is no value in identifying good
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projects (v2 < v1+z1). In the former case, it is always optimal to allocate all resources to a single
project, while in the latter case, the firm always prefers to split resources evenly between the two
projects. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we analyze the more interesting situation
where the marginal value of investing more resources in a product is decreasing, v2 < 2v1 and
z2 < 2z1, and where “winner-picking” is valuable for the firm, v2 > v1 + z1. This implies
that all else being equal, splitting resources evenly between two good (bad) products yields
higher profits than allocating all resources into a single good (bad) product. This assumption
is also in line with recent empirical work that shows that firms with a broader product portfolio
scope experience higher performance (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). Lastly, for clarity of
exposition, we focus on cases where the marginal value of having a second product is smaller for
bad products than for good products, i.e., 2z1 − z2 < 2v1 − v2. In other words, when products
are bad, the decision of whether to split resources or allocate all of them in one product, is
relatively inconsequential for the firm compared to the case of good products where the stakes
are much higher. This implies that shifting resources is more critical for good rather than bad
products.
The Compensation Scheme
As discussed in our motivating examples, companies often struggle to strike a balance between
individual incentives (e.g., rewarding a specific CEDD for its performance in the case of GSK)
and shared incentives (e.g., as in Wyeth where divisions were rewarded based on the R&D
performance of the entire organization). While the former is typical in agency relationships and
requires little justification, our model also illustrates why, in many settings, the latter might be
equally important. In particular, it can be readily seen that, if a manager’s payoff depends only
on the performance of his own product, then the manager is always better off by communicating
a positive recommendation for his product, so that he receives more resources from the firm.
Thus, information becomes unreliable, and therefore, irrelevant for the resource allocation de-
cisions of the firm. However, once shared incentives are included in the compensation scheme,
a manager who observes a bad signal, and anticipates that his product is likely to fail, becomes
more likely to “step aside” and allow his peer’s product to receive more resources.
In line with prior literature on shared incentives (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994; Siemsen
et al., 2007; Friebel and Raith, 2010), we focus on compensation schemes of the following
structure: wˆi = k0 + ksνi + kpνj , where k0 is a fixed wage, ks is the self-product sensitivity
that determines the manager’s share from the performance of his own product, and kp is the
respective peer-product sensitivity.5 We refer to ks as “individual incentive”, and to kp as
“shared incentive”. Our compensation scheme is mathematically equivalent to wˆi = k0 + (ks −
kp)νi + kp(νi + νj). Intuitively, (ks − kp) determines the share that each manager receives from
his own product’s value, and kp determines the share that the managers receive from the firm’s
overall performance. Consistent with the aforementioned papers, we restrict attention to linear
5Where appropriate, we use the notation xˆ to denote a random variable, and distinguish it from its expected
value which, for notational convenience, we denote by x.
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compensation contracts that are symmetric between the two agents.6
We employ a linear compensation scheme for three reasons. First, under fairly general con-
ditions, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that optimal compensation schemes are
linear in the aggregated outcome when agents influence outcomes through a series of actions.
Based on this fundamental result, linear compensation schemes have become pervasive in the
academic literature when studying, e.g., incentive design (Siemsen et al., 2007), relative per-
formance evaluation (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), or optimal organizational forms (Friebel
and Raith, 2010). Second, contract linearity allows us to derive analytical results in a complex
setting that combines ex-ante moral hazard with ex-post adverse selection, and facilitates the re-
quired mathematical exposition. Lastly, linear schemes are intuitive and easily implementable,
and thus, widely found in practice. For example, at Wyeth employees received shares of an
overall bonus pool.
Given the compensation wˆi, manager i’s utility Uˆi is comprised of wˆi net his effort cost,
i.e., Uˆi = wˆi − cI{ei=h}, where I{A} is the indicator function of event A. Following a typical
assumption in the principal-agent literature, we assume that managers have limited liability,
i.e., wˆi ≥ 0, and that they are risk-neutral. Finally, the firm’s profit is the sum of the products’
market value minus the managers’ compensation, which is Πˆ(k) =
∑
i νi−wˆi = (1−ks−kp)(νi+
νj) − 2k0. For ease of exposition, we refer to manager i’s expected wage and utility, and the
firm’s expected profit by wi, Ui, and Π, respectively, where the expectation is taken over the
products’ market potential, θ.
4 Analysis
In this section we characterize the firm’s optimal product evaluation and resource allocation
strategy. To ensure that the derived equilibrium solution is subgame perfect, we solve our model
by backwards induction. Therefore, we first determine the firm’s optimal resource allocation
policy for any given outcome of the product evaluation stage (section 4.1). Then, we examine
the incentive schemes that the firm can use to induce the desired level of product evaluation
by the product managers (section 4.2). Finally, we characterize the optimal product evaluation
strategy (section 4.3) accounting for the fact that different product evaluation strategies require
different incentive schemes.
6Our focus on symmetric contracts is based on the theory of equity (Adams, 1963). In the words of Akerlof and
Yellen (1988, p.45): “All textbooks consider it self-evident that the most important aspect of a compensation
system is its accordance with workers’ conceptions of equity”. A more detailed discussion about the numerous
studies that provide support for this theory can be found in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In our setting, given that managers are ex-ante identical, an
asymmetric contract would be hard to put in place without the firm suffering severe repercussions from the
managers’ sense of unfairness. As such, in the remainder of our analysis we assume a symmetric contract
structure. It is worth noting though, that our characterization of the optimal product evaluation strategy
holds for asymmetric contract structures as well (the analysis is available upon request from the authors).
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4.1 The Optimal Resource Allocation Strategy
Once the firm receives the recommendations of the two managers, it decides on the amount
of resources to allocate to each product. Clearly, when the managers do not report truthfully
their signals, their recommendations are not informative to the firm, and the firm allocates the
resources based on its prior beliefs. That is, resources are evenly split across the two products.
When the managers report truthfully their signals, the firm needs to consider three different
cases for the evaluation stage: (i) both managers exert low effort, e = (l, l); (ii) manager i
exerts high effort, while manager j exerts low effort, e = (h, l); and (iii) both managers exert
high effort, e = (h, h).7 The optimal resource allocation strategy maps the managers’ product
evaluation strategy e = (ei, ej) together with the received recommendations m = (mi,mj)
into the resource allocation that maximizes expected profits. Note that, as we show in the
next section, through the design of an appropriate contract, the firm can always anticipate the
evaluation strategy of its managers and whether or not they report truthfully their signals.
Lemma 1 fully characterizes the firm’s optimal resource allocation strategy. For brevity and
expositional clarity, all proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 (The Optimal Resource Allocation). Define q0 ≡ (v1 + z1 − z2)/(v2 − z2),
qg ≡ (v1 + 3z1 − 2z2)/2(v2 − v1 − z2 + z1), qb ≡ (3v1 − v2 + z1 − z2)/2(v1 − z1), and note
that 12 < qb < qg. Then, for a given evaluation strategy e, a signal precision q, and received
recommendations m, the firm’s optimal resource allocation is summarized in Table 2, where
“—” indicates that the result holds for any possible realization of the respective parameter.
Table 2: The optimal resource allocation.
Evaluation efforts Signal precision Received recommendations Optimal resource
e = (ei, ej) q m = (mi,mj) allocation
(l, l) — — split evenly
(h, l)
q < qb — split evenly
qb ≤ q < qg (g,−) split evenly(b,−) all to product j
qg ≤ q (g,−) all to product i(b,−) all to product j
(h, h)
q ≤ q0 — split evenly
q > q0




Lemma 1 presents some intuitive properties of the firm’s optimal resource allocation strat-
egy. First, when both managers exert low effort, the firm does not receive any useful information,
so it decides to split resources evenly across the two products. In the case where only manager i
pursues a high-effort product evaluation, the firm will only direct all of its resource to the most
7Throughout, we adopt the convention that in case of asymmetric effort levels, manager i always exerts high
effort, while manager j exerts low effort.
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promising product, if the information precision is high enough. Otherwise, if q < qg (q < qb),
then the good (bad) signal for product i is discarded, and resources are still split evenly. The
last case also highlights the substitution effect between the two products: even if there is no
high-effort recommendation for the product at hand (in this case product j), it might still be
optimal to invest all resources into it as long as there is reliable information that product i is
of low market potential. Lastly, when both managers exert high effort, the optimal resource
allocation depends on both managers’ recommendations. If the two managers give identical
recommendations, then, again, an equal split of the resources is the preferable choice. If, on
the other hand, the recommendations are different, then all resources should be directed to the
most promising product.
4.2 Product Evaluation under Asymmetric Information
In the previous section, we characterized the optimal resource allocation strategy, given that the
managers report truthfully their signals. Recall that, given the information asymmetry between
the managers and the firm, such truthful reporting cannot be taken for granted, but rather,
it has to be induced through an appropriate incentive scheme. In this section, we derive the
optimal contract that allows the firm to induce high-effort evaluation and truthful reporting
(Proposition 2), and discuss how our key contextual parameters affect the balance between
individual and shared incentives. To establish a benchmark for our subsequent discussion and
to illustrate the key tradeoffs of the firm’s operating environment, we begin with the first-best
product evaluation strategy in which the managers and the firm act as one entity.
The First-Best Benchmark
Without any incentive misalignment between the product managers and the firm, the firm
does not need to pay any bonus ks or kp to motivate the managers to exert high effort and
to truthfully reveal their information. The firm simply reimburses the product managers for
their effort costs by paying a fixed wage k0 = c. Hence, without any information asymmetry,
the firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy solves eFB = arg maxe Π
FB(e), where ΠFB(e) =
Eθ[νi+νj |e]−c(I{ei=h}+I{ej=h}) denotes the firm’s ex-ante expected profit under the evaluation
strategy e.
Proposition 1 (First-Best Product Evaluation). Let qc ≡ (3v1−v2+3z1−2z2)/(v2−z2),
and define ζ1 ≡ 14(qv2 − v1 + (1− q)z2 − z1), ζ2 ≡ 14(2(v1 + z1)− (v2 + z2)), and ζ3 ≡ 2ζ1 − ζ2.
The firm’s first-best product evaluation strategy is as follows:
(i) If q < qc, then, e
FB = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ1; and eFB = (l, l) elsewhere.
(ii) If q ≥ qc, then, eFB = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ2; eFB = (h, l) for ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3; and eFB = (l, l)
elsewhere.
Figure 2 illustrates the key properties of the first-best evaluation strategy. Firstly, as
we would intuitively expect, high-effort evaluation is undertaken only when the information
precision is sufficiently high, q > q0, and the evaluation cost sufficiently low, c ≤ max{ζ1, ζ3}.
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The firm’s first-best product evaluation is (i) eFB = (h, h) in the light gray region; (ii) eFB = (h, l) in the dark
gray region; and (iii) eFB = (l, l) in the white area.
Otherwise, the value of information does not justify its cost, and the firm decides to forgo the
rather inefficient evaluation process. Remarkably, even if the evaluation cost is zero, the firm
never exerts high-effort product evaluation if q ≤ q0. In this case, the information precision is so
low that the outcome of the product evaluation would not affect the firm’s resource allocation
policy. As such, the value of information is zero, and the firm does not undertake product
evaluation despite the negligible cost of doing so.
Secondly, for moderate q values (q0 < q < qc), the firm adopts a rather coarse evaluation
strategy by either exerting high effort for both products or none. However, for higher q values
(q ≥ qc) and moderate costs c (ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3), the firm finds it optimal to pursue high-effort
evaluation for only one of its products. Thus, even if the information is perfect (q = 1), the
firm should not evaluate both products unless the cost is sufficiently low (c < ζ2). Moreover, if
a product’s market value is relatively insensitive to the allocated resources, i.e., v2 <
3
2(v1 +z1),
then the asymmetric effort strategy, e = (h, l), is never optimal (i.e., qc > 1). On the contrary, if
the market value is very sensitive to the invested resources (v2 ≈ 2v1), then pursuing high-effort
for only a single product is optimal for a wide range of parameters (as qc approaches
1
2).
Incentives for Product Evaluation
In this section, we account for the key challenge that motivated our study: the highly specialized
and complex nature of pharmaceutical R&D projects gives rise to information asymmetries
between the managers and the firm. As such, to elicit the necessary information for an efficient
resource allocation, the firm needs to design appropriate incentive schemes. As discussed earlier,
managers can pursue three different evaluation strategies. The firm can induce each one of the
evaluation strategies by offering an appropriate incentive scheme. Essentially, the firm has to
balance the benefits from a specific product evaluation strategy, with the direct (i.e., wages)
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and indirect (i.e., information rents) costs associated with it.
By the revelation principle, the search for an optimal incentive scheme can, without loss of
generality, be restricted to contracts that induce truthful reporting by the managers. Intuitively,
non-truth-telling contracts provide no value to the firm, and therefore, the firm would never
reward a manager for providing inconsequential information. Moreover, the next Lemma states
that a contract that incentivizes only one product manager to exert high-effort evaluation can
never be incentive compatible. Intuitively, given ex-ante identical managers, if the contract
terms are such that one of the managers decides to exert high effort, so does the other.
Lemma 2 (Symmetric Effort). No symmetric compensation scheme exists such that, in
equilibrium, managers are truth-telling and choose different effort levels during product evalua-
tion.
By Lemma 2, to find the firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy, we only need to
investigate the firm’s optimal contract that induces truth-telling and high effort by either both
managers or neither. Consider first the simpler case where the firm incentivizes both managers
to pursue a low-effort evaluation strategy. In that case, the optimal contract is k0 = ks = kp = 0.
This contract is clearly incentive compatible in effort because no manager has an incentive to
exert high effort, since then he would incur a cost without receiving any reward. In short, the
firm can induce low-effort product evaluation by simply offering no reward to its managers,
and in that case, the firm optimally splits resources evenly across products (since v2 < 2v1 and
z2 < 2z1) to obtain an expected profit Π(k = 0) = v1 + z1.
We now examine the more interesting case where the firm incentivizes both managers
to exert high-effort evaluation and to truthfully report their signals. In that case, the firm’s
objective is to maximize the expected value of both products net the managers’ wages. More
formally, the firm solves the following optimization problem (the detailed derivation can be
found in the proof of Lemma 3):
max
k0,ks,kp
Π(k) = (1− ks − kp)1
2
(qv2 + v1 + (1− q)z2 + z1)− 2k0 (P)
s.t. ks(qv2 + (1− q)z2) + kp(qv1 + (1− q)z1) ≥ kp(qv2 + (1− q)z2) + kp((1− q)v1 + qz1)
(IC-g)
kp(qv2 + (1− q)z2) + kp((1− q)v1 + qz1) ≥ ks((1− q)v2 + qz2) + kp(qv1 + (1− q)z1)
(IC-b)
2ks(qv2 + (1− q)z2)− 8c ≥ ks(v2 + z2) (IC-e)
k0 + ksz2 ≥ 0, k0 + kpz2 ≥ 0. (LL)
Constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b) ensure that both managers truthfully reveal a good and
a bad signal, respectively. These constraints are necessary to address the adverse selection
problem at the recommendation stage. Similarly, the moral hazard problem at the product
evaluation stage is addressed by constraint (IC-e) that ensures that managers are better off
exerting high-effort product evaluation. Lastly, the limited liability constraints (LL) guarantee
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that managers’ wages are non-negative. Before we analyze the combined case of moral hazard
and adverse selection described above, it is instructive to disentangle the effect of each source
of information asymmetry on the design of the incentive scheme.
First, consider the case where only adverse selection is present. In this case, the managers’
efforts are observable and the firm can contract directly on them. Mathematically, the firm
solves the optimization problem outlined above, but without constraint (IC-e). Then, it is
optimal for the firm to just reimburse each manager for his effort costs by paying a fixed wage
k0 = c. Moreover, since each manager receives a fixed wage, independent of the realization of
his project value, managers have no incentive to misrepresent their signals. In other words, no
additional bonus payments are necessary to persuade a manager to truthfully reveal his private
signal. Hence, under observable effort, regardless of whether the signals are public or private,
the firm realizes first-best profits.
We now consider the case where only moral hazard is present. In this case, the managers’
efforts are unobservable but their signals are public. Mathematically, the firm solves the op-
timization problem outlined above, but without constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b). Interestingly,
according to Lemma 3, public signals are not sufficient to mitigate the incentive misalignment
between the managers and the firm, and as such, the firm cannot realize first-best profits.
Lemma 3 (Optimal Contract under Pure Moral Hazard). Let qd ≡ (3z2−z1−v1)/(v2−
z2). With public signals, the optimal contract that induces high-effort product evaluation by both
managers is:
(i) If q < qd, then ks = kp =
8c
(2q−1)(v2−z2) , and k0 = −kpz2.
(ii) If q ≥ qd, then ks = 8c(2q−1)(v2−z2) , k0 = kp = 0.
Lemma 3 reveals that the structure of the optimal contract critically depends on the value
of the information precision. Note that, under pure moral hazard, the only purpose served by
the contract is to induce high-effort product evaluation. Specifically, the primary lever that the
firm uses to induce effort is the individual incentive, ks. A higher ks makes the manager more
inclined to request resources for his project, and therefore, more willing to acquire information
that indicates the potential of his project.
When the information precision is high (q ≥ qd), it is optimal for the firm to induce high
effort by emphasizing only the individual performance incentives (ks > 0), while keeping both
the fixed wage, k0, and the shared incentives, kp, to zero. This happens because, when q is
high, information is more valuable both for the manager and the firm. From the manager’s
perspective, information of higher precision not only allows the manager to demonstrate the
superiority of his product more clearly, but it also means that, conditioning on a good signal,
his product is more likely to succeed. As a result, inducing high-effort evaluation becomes
“cheaper” for the firm which can lower the manager’s share, ks, and still satisfy the manager’s
incentive compatibility constraint. On the contrary, when the information precision is low
(q < qd), exerting high effort is less promising for the manager, and therefore more expensive
for the firm which has to commit to a relatively high ks (ks decreases in q). To offset this high
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bonus payment, the firm introduces the negative fixed wage k0 < 0 through which the firm
extracts the manager’s information rents.
One might wonder why the firm needs to introduce shared incentives in a setting where
signals are public, and therefore, the managers need not be incentivized to reveal them truthfully.
Interestingly, the sole purpose of shared incentives in this case is to allow the firm to introduce
a negative fixed wage without violating the managers’ limited liability constraints. Intuitively,
when a manager incurs the fixed wage upfront, and receives a bad signal, all the resources are
allocated to his peer’s project. Then, unless he receives a share from his peer’s project value
(kp > 0), the manager ends up with a negative wage. In fact, because ex-ante, the likelihood of
a good and a bad signal are equal to each other, so are the sensitivity parameters ks and kp. In
short, the firm perfectly aligns the managers’ compensation with the overall firm performance,
without offering an additional reward for individual over peer performance. Having discussed
the role of adverse selection and moral hazard separately, we are now ready to analyze the
optimal contract when both are present.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection).
The optimal contract that induces truth-telling and high-effort product evaluation by both man-
agers is:






(2q−1)(v2−z2) , and k0 = −k∗pz2.
(ii) If q ≥ qd, then k∗s = 8c(2q−1)(v2−z2) , k∗p =
(1−q)v2+qz2
q(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1+(1−q)(z2−z1)+qz1 · k∗s , and
k∗0 = −k∗pz2.
The first noteworthy result of Proposition 2 is that for q < qd, the optimal contract is
identical to the contract described under pure moral hazard (Lemma 3). In other words, in
low information precision environments, the presence of adverse selection does not affect the
optimal contract. The striking similarity of the two contracts can be explained as follows.
Mathematically, accounting for adverse selection in addition to moral hazard, implies that we
need to include constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b) in the optimization problem solved in Lemma 3.
Recall, from the discussion in Lemma 3, that the optimal contract for q < qd, is such that a
manager’s compensation is perfectly aligned with the firm’s overall performance as the manager
is equally rewarded for the success of his project as he is for the success of his peer’s (i.e.,
k∗s = k∗p). As such, the manager has no incentive to misreport his signal, and it can be easily
verified that constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b) are always satisfied. Hence, for q < qd the optimal
contract remains the same as in the corresponding part of Lemma 3. In the remainder of this
section, we focus on the second part of Proposition 2.
For q ≥ qd, the structure of the optimal contract is fundamentally different than the cor-
responding part of Lemma 3. In this case, the firm no longer focuses entirely on individual
incentives, but introduces shared incentives aimed specifically at inducing truth-telling among
the competing managers.8 At optimality, the firm needs to pay just enough to induce truth-
telling by a manager with a bad signal, i.e., constraint (IC-b) is binding. Since it is more
8Recall that for q < qd, the role of shared incentives were to satisfy the limited liability constraints rather than
induce truth-telling.
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expensive to motivate a manager to reveal his bad signal than his good signal, constraint (IC-g)
is always non-binding. It is also noteworthy that the addition of adverse selection does not affect
the share of individual incentives, k∗s , as the latter is determined entirely by constraint (IC-e),
which at optimality is always binding, and importantly, independent of k∗p. Put differently, the
presence of adverse selection, even though it changes the structure of the optimal contract, it
does not interfere with the effort incentives (moral hazard). Interestingly, the reverse is not
true, as the presence of moral hazard affects the contract terms that address adverse selection,
namely, k∗p depends on k∗s . Graphically, this is illustrated in Figure 3 in which the optimal
contract is determined by the intersection of constraints (IC-e) and (IC-b). Lastly, k0 is always
set so that the second limited liability constraint is binding.









The light gray region indicates the set of all feasible contracts that induce truth-telling and high effort for given
k0 and q ≥ qd. The optimal bonus payment (k∗s , k∗p) is at the intersection of (IC-b) and (IC-e).
Balancing Individual versus Shared Incentives
Having characterized the structure of the optimal contract, we now explore how the balance
between individual and shared incentives changes with respect to our key parameters. First,
with simple algebraic manipulation it can be readily seen that both k∗s and k∗p decrease in q.
In other words, managers who can acquire better information receive a smaller share of each
product’s value. This counter-intuitive finding can be explained as follows. Recall that k∗s is
entirely determined by constraint (IC-e). From (IC-e) we see that as the precision, q, increases,
all else being equal, exerting high effort becomes more rewarding for the manager than exerting
low effort. This happens because the only reason for the manager to exert high effort is so
that he can credibly indicate the product’s high potential to the firm, and therefore, request
more resources for it. Clearly, the credibility of the manager’s recommendation, and thus, his
incentive to exert high effort in the first place increase as the information precision increases.
As such, a higher information precision makes higher effort more rewarding for the manager.
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At the same time, the firm realizes that it can now lower the manager’s share of his project
value, k∗s , while still ensuring that his effort incentive constraint (IC-e) is satisfied. That is why
k∗s decreases in q.
To see why k∗p decreases in q, recall that the reason why a manager with a bad signal might
report a good signal is that he can request more resources for his project. These resources,
however, are only beneficial to the manager if his project eventually succeeds in the market.
As the information precision increases, and given that the manager has observed a bad signal,
the likelihood that his project will “defy the odds”, and turn into a success, is shrinking. As a
result, lying to the firm becomes less rewarding, and all else being equal, the firm can incentivize
truth-telling with a lower k∗p. Intuitively, managers with a high evaluation precision are likely to
truthfully report their signals, as there is little value in claiming resources for a project that is
bound to fail. It is worth noting the stark contrast regarding the effect of a noisier environment
on the pay-performance sensitivities (i.e., k∗s and k∗p) between our model and the standard theory
on principal-agent models. For instance, in his seminal work Holmstrom (1979) shows that the
pay-performance sensitivity increases as the effort has more influence on the final outcome, i.e.,
as the environment becomes less noisy. This comparison highlights the fundamentally different
nature of incentives that induce higher effort for information acquisition versus moral hazard
settings where an agent’s effort stochastically improves the outcome of the project.
Second, both k∗s and k∗p decrease as v2 increases, i.e., when allocating all the resources to a
single project becomes more rewarding. The former happens because a higher v2 makes exerting
effort more rewarding for the manager: if his project receives the entire resource budget, its
market value will be much higher, and so will his share of that value. The latter happens
because a higher v2 makes the manager more willing to disclose a bad signal truthfully: if his
peer’s product succeeds, he will also receive a share from that high value project. Thus, as




p to incentivize the managers to exert
high-effort and report truthfully. Interestingly, k∗s is invariant in v1 while k∗p increases in v1.
A higher v1 erodes the value from ex-post “winner-picking”, and therefore, it has the exact
opposite effect of v2 when it comes to incentivizing truth-telling. It has no effect, however,
when it comes to incentivizing high effort ex-ante, as due to symmetry the manager might still
receive v1 in either case (i.e., under high or low effort).




< 1 and the ratio
decreases in q and v2, while it is invariant in c.
By Corollary 1, the ratio of k∗p to k∗s decreases in both q and v2, but it is invariant in




telling. To see why the cost c does not affect a manager’s truth-telling propensity, note that
each manager decides on his recommendation after incurring the effort cost. Hence, effort costs
are sunk costs and do not affect a manager’s recommendation. To see why k∗p is decreasing
more steeply in q than k∗s , note that information of higher precision is always more crucial
ex-post (i.e., when a bad signal has actually been realized) than ex-ante (i.e., when either a
good or a bad signal can be realized). More specifically, a higher precision raises the manager’s
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payoff if a good signal is realized, but lowers his payoff if a bad signal is realized. Due to
this uncertainty, k∗s is only moderately decreasing in q. In contrast, when the manager decides
whether to truthfully report his bad signal, q has a direct detrimental effect on the value of his
project. Therefore, k∗p is more sensitive to the manager’s information precision.
This result bears important managerial implications for the optimal balance between in-
dividual and shared incentives. It states that in environments of higher information precision
(high q) or where “winner-picking” is more crucial (high v2), the firm needs to shift its fo-
cus towards rewarding based on the performance of individual project units rather than on
company-wide metrics. So far, our discussion was focused on the pay-performance sensitivities
k∗s and k∗p. One might think that even though k∗s and k∗p decrease in q and increase in c, the
total utility of a manager might increase in the precision of his information and decrease in his
effort costs. Rather surprisingly, Proposition 3 shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 3 (Information Rents). A manager’s expected utility Ui(k
∗) decreases in q and
v2, and increases in c; while the firm’s expected profit Π(k
∗) increases in q and v2, and decreases
in c.
Proposition 3 states a counter-intuitive result: a manager’s utility decreases in the in-
formation precision of the evaluation process, that is, when the manager can provide better
information to the firm. Similarly, when this information becomes more important (i.e., v2
increases), the manager’s utility decreases as well. Thus, even though a higher q and higher




p is so steep that it leaves
each manager with a lower expected utility. On the contrary, a manager’s utility increases in c
as both k∗s and k∗p increase in c. This can be explained as follows. Recall from our discussion
following Proposition 2 that both a higher q and higher v2 reduce the misalignment in incentives
between the managers and the firm. As such, they make the manager more willing to exert high
effort and also to disclose his signal truthfully. Conversely, a higher c makes high effort more
costly for the manager, and widens the incentive misalignment with the firm. A lower (higher)
misalignment in incentives, in turn, results in lower (higher) information rents for the manager,
and consequently, to higher (lower) profits for the firm.
4.3 The Optimal Product Evaluation Strategy
Given the optimal contract structure, and the corresponding information rents for each evalu-
ation strategy, we can now derive the firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy. In addition,
in this section, we compare this optimal strategy with the option of outsourcing the product
evaluation to an external provider. This comparison is important because outsourcing is of-
ten considered an effective way to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by the misalignment of
incentives within the organization.
Proposition 4 (The Optimal Product Evaluation Strategy). Define





. The firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy
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is to incentivize both managers to exert (i) high effort if c ≤ ζ4; and (ii) low effort if c > ζ4.
Moreover, ζ4 < ζ1 and there exist parameter values such that ζ4 > ζ2.
As we would intuitively expect, the presence of information asymmetry between the man-
agers and the firm makes the process of product evaluation “more expensive” to the firm. As a
result, the area for which product evaluation is undertaken shrinks. This is clearly illustrated
in Figure 4 which plots the firm’s optimal evaluation strategy vis-a`-vis the first-best benchmark
(dashed line): In the region ABFEC the firm does not undertake any high-effort product evalu-
ation, even though it is optimal to do so in the first-best case. Mathematically, this corresponds
to ζ4 < max{ζ1, ζ3}.
Interestingly, however, this result does not imply that the firm always undertakes less eval-
uation effort compared to the first-best benchmark. On the contrary, when ζ4 > ζ2 (region CED
in Figure 4), the firm undertakes more evaluation effort by exerting high-effort evaluation for
both products whereas in the first-best policy the firm exerts high-effort evaluation for only one
of them. In other words, the firm is actually over-investing in information acquisition compared
to the first-best benchmark. This over-investment in information is caused by the fact that
the firm cannot observe either the managers’ efforts or the outcomes of their evaluation. In
addition, as discussed in Lemma 2, the firm cannot offer a truth-telling contract that incen-
tivizes a high-effort evaluation for one product and a low-effort evaluation for the other one.
Consequently, either manager can claim that he exerted high-effort evaluation, and therefore,
request resources for his project.















The firm’s optimal contract induces (i) e∗ = (h, h) in the light gray region; and (ii) e∗ = (l, l) in the white area.
Outsourcing as a Product Evaluation Strategy
A key managerial implication from the previous discussion is that information asymmetries can
significantly distort the firm’s product evaluation strategy. Some firms attempt to circumvent
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For any information structure, the firm prefers outsourcing below the respective threshold function.
this distortion by outsourcing their evaluation processes to external providers. The main premise
of this remedy is that external providers can offer more objective evaluations as they are not
subject to the various organizational dynamics, such as the managerial competition for resources.
At the same time, however, it is reasonable to expect that the firm’s managers know more about
their products, and as such, their evaluations are more accurate. As such, the firm needs to
consider whether the benefits of circumventing the effects of information asymmetry outweigh
the negative implications of a lower information precision.
Let qout < q and cout denote the information precision and cost, respectively, when the
evaluation process is outsourced. Proposition 5 characterizes the optimal product evaluation
strategy by comparing the firm’s profits under the optimal internal product evaluation strategy
(Proposition 4) with the firm’s profits under an outsourced product evaluation strategy. For
expositional clarity, in Figure 5 we plot the more typical case where outsourcing offers a cost
advantage compared to in-house evaluation (due to economies of scale or specialization), i.e.,
cout < c, but the results of Proposition 5 hold for any values of c.
Proposition 5 (Outsourcing). (i) There exists a unique q(c) such that, it is optimal for the
firm to keep the product evaluation in-house, if and only if q ≥ q(c).
(ii) Let qMH(c), qAS(c), and qFB(c) denote the corresponding threshold values under pure
moral hazard, pure adverse selection, and under first-best. Then, q(c) ≥ qMH(c) > qAS(c) =
qFB(c). Moreover, q(c)− qAS(c) and qMH(c)− qAS(c) increase concavely in c.
(iii) Lastly, q(c) and qMH(c) increase concavely in c, while qAS(c) increases linearly in c.
The first part of Proposition 5 states that a firm is better off keeping the evaluation process
in-house, and therefore, incurring the implications of information asymmetries, as long as its
managers can provide information of sufficiently higher precision (q > q(c)). Clearly, as in-house
evaluation becomes more expensive, an even higher precision is required to offset the increasing
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cost advantage of outsourcing, i.e., q(c) increases in c. In the pharmaceutical industry, the
typical example of an outsourced evaluation process are the Phase III clinical trials. Those trials
are outsourced to Contract Research Organizations (CRO) such as Parexel or Quintiles, that
specialize in these processes and perform clinical trials for multiple pharmaceutical companies.
Importantly, this is a regulated stage, with clear signals about the performance of the drug, and
as such, performing them in-house doesn’t offer any significant benefit. On the other hand, what
constitutes a successful outcome during Phase IIa clinical trials may largely depend on a firm’s
business strategy and risk perception, and as such, firm-specific capabilities and knowledge can
play a key role in the selection process. Our analysis would suggest that firms are more likely
to outsource a Phase III clinical trial than a Phase IIa clinical trial.
The second part of Proposition 5 examines how the critical threshold q(c) changes under
different information structures. First note that, consistent with our earlier discussion (before
Lemma 3), when effort is contractible and information asymmetry stems only from adverse
selection, the firm can achieve first-best profits. That is why qAS(c) = qFB(c). In this case,
the comparison between an in-house versus an outsourced product evaluation is entirely driven
by the additional value of a higher precision versus the relatively higher cost, rather than
the indirect costs of information asymmetry. However, under pure moral hazard, a significantly
higher internal information precision is required, i.e., qMH(c) > qAS(c). Interestingly, combining
moral hazard and adverse selection, only moderately increases the threshold, q(c). This result
implies that, all else being equal, firms are more likely to outsource the product evaluation
when they cannot observe the efforts of their managers. This happens because a large portion
of a manager’s information rents are attributed to the non-verifiability of effort (Lemma 3).
On the other hand, if efforts are verifiable, not being able to observe and interpret the signals
generated by the product evaluation process, should not affect the firm’s propensity to outsource.
In addition, the fact that the difference between the thresholds increases in c highlights that
the distortion caused by the information asymmetry increases in the evaluation cost, c.
Lastly, the fact that q(c) and qMH(c) increase concavely in c (Proposition 5(iii)) reveals
a rather counter-intuitive insight regarding the relationship between the evaluation precision,
q, and the cost of information acquisition, c. One would expect that as information becomes
more expensive (c increases), the marginal value of more precise information (∂Π/∂q) would
decrease. Yet, as we show in the Appendix (proof of Proposition 5), the concavity of q(c)
is driven by the positive cross-partial derivative of the firm’s profits with respect to q and c
(i.e., ∂2Π/∂q∂c > 0). This complementarity between q and c leads to an important insight: a
higher precision, q, is relatively more important for the firm when the information acquisition
costs are high. This happens because when information is more reliable, the firm can not only
allocate its resources better, but it can also incentivize the managers to exert effort at a lower
cost. In short, a higher q reduces the misalignment of incentives between the firm and the
managers. This is particularly important when the managers face high private costs, that is,
when c is high. An alternative explanation is also instructive: firm profits decrease in c as the
firm needs to pay higher bonuses, but when q is high, this profit reduction is mitigated by the
22
more efficient resource allocation. In short, more efficient resource allocation processes (through
better information) are critical when effort is expensive.
5 The Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Firm’s Product
Portfolio Scope and Profitability
So far, we have discussed the effects of information asymmetry on the firm’s optimal product
evaluation strategy. This evaluation strategy, in turn, determines the information that the firm
has available when making its resource allocation decisions, and therefore, the firm’s product
portfolio scope. While the extant literature in NPD has studied extensively the information
acquisition process for a single project (e.g., Thomke, 2007, and references therein) and the
resource allocation decisions for the product portfolio (e.g., Kavadias and Chao 2007, and refer-
ences therein), the effect of the former on the latter has been rather overlooked. In particular,
the extant literature provides little insights on whether the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion, at the product evaluation stage, would lead to an overly broad or narrow portfolio scope
compared to the first-best benchmark. In this section, we begin by investigating how changes
in the firm’s evaluation strategy affect its product portfolio scope. We then examine the firm’s
profits and the social welfare, and identify the conditions where information asymmetry leads
to greater or lesser profit and welfare losses.
5.1 Product Portfolio Scope
Before discussing the effect of information asymmetry on the firm’s product portfolio scope, it is
instructive to clarify the relationship between the product evaluation strategy and the product
portfolio scope for the first-best policy. From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we have the following
direct observations: (i) when the firm pursues low-effort evaluation for both products, it always
ends up splitting resources evenly across products, and thus, developing both products; (ii)
when the firm pursues high-effort evaluation for only one of the products, and the information
is relatively reliable, then the firm always develops a single product; (iii) when the firm pursues
high-effort evaluation for both of its products, then it is equally likely that the firm develops
one or two products.
In other words, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the extent of product evalu-
ation and the number of products that the firm develops: a firm with little information spreads
its risks across both products to increase the chance that at least one product is successful,
a partially informed firm makes a crude decision by developing only one, while a fully in-
formed firm might choose either allocation strategy depending on its refined information. This
non-monotonic effect is illustrated in Figure 6 which plots the first-best expected product de-
velopment scope, nFB, for all possible cases (dashed line). Proposition 6 sheds light on how
information asymmetry affects the firm’s product portfolio scope, n.
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Proposition 6 (Product Portfolio Scope). For any given q and c, information asymmetry
weakly increases a firm’s expected product portfolio scope, i.e., n ≥ nFB.
Proposition 6 highlights that information asymmetries lead a firm to broaden its product
portfolio scope compared to the first-best benchmark. Recall from Proposition 4 that in some
regions, managerial competition results in under-investment in information (region ABFEC in
Figure 4), while in others it results in over-investment (region CED in Figure 4). In either case,
the information asymmetry between the firm and its managers impedes an asymmetric product
evaluation strategy, which corresponds to launching a single product on the market. Instead,
the firm has to choose between spreading its bets across products under limited information
versus a more refined, but overly costly product portfolio allocation.






















The firm’s expected product development scope under information asymmetry (solid line) and first-best conditions
(dashed line) for q < qc (left), q ≥ qc and ζ4 < ζ2 (middle), and q ≥ qc and ζ4 ≥ ζ2 (right), respectively.
5.2 Profit and Welfare Loss
To measure the efficiency of the firm’s contract scheme, we employ two different performance
indicators: the firm’s percentage profit loss, which captures the effect of the product evaluation
process on the firm’s profits, ηp ≡ 1− Π(e
∗)
ΠFB(eFB)
, and the percentage welfare loss, which reflects




two performance measures quantify the implications of information asymmetry on two different
levels of aggregation. While ηp captures the effect on the firm’s level, ηw measures the contract’s
social efficiency for the entire system (firm and managers).
Proposition 7 (Profit Loss and Social Inefficiency). If the firm under-(over-)invests
in product evaluation, then ηp > 0 and ηw > 0 increase (decrease) in q and v2, and decrease
(increase) in c. If e∗ = eFB = (h, h), then ηw = 0, and ηp > 0 decreases in q and v2, and
increases in c. Otherwise, if e∗ = eFB = (l, l), then ηp = ηw = 0.
According to Proposition 7, the effect of information asymmetry varies significantly across
the different regions depicted in Figure 4. Recall from Figure 4 that if the cost of information
acquisition is very high (c > max{ζ1, ζ3}), then the firm never exerts any high-effort product
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evaluation, and therefore, the firm does not need to incentivize its managers. As such, the firm
is able to accrue all the profits (ηp = 0), and the employed compensation scheme is socially
efficient (ηw = 0). This finding is part of a very general result of Proposition 7. If information
asymmetries do not affect the firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy, then there is no
welfare loss; the total generated value remains intact (ηw = 0) and it is only the distribution of
profits between the firm and the managers that changes (ηp ≥ 0). As discussed in Figure 4, this
happens either when the information precision is very high and the evaluation cost very low, or
at the other extreme, when the information precision is very low and the evaluation cost very
high. In the former case, information acquisition is so effective that the firm always evaluates
both products, while in the latter, it is so ineffective that the firm always chooses to forgo
costly product evaluation. In reality, however, most firms face environments where valuable
information is also costly. Importantly, in these regions, information asymmetry interferes with
the firm’s optimal evaluation strategy, and leads to welfare and profit losses.
When the firm under-invests in product evaluation (region ABFEC in Figure 4), i.e., collects
less information than is socially optimal, then ηp and ηw increase in q and v2, and decrease in c.
Intuitively, as the firm under-invests in product evaluation, a higher q implies that more valuable
information is lost, and therefore the profit and welfare loss becomes steeper. Obviously, this
effect is even more severe as v2 increases, and the value of ex-post winner-picking is higher.
Lastly, when the firm induces high-effort product evaluation (region under ACE) for both
products, ηp decreases in q and v2, and increases in c. As discussed in Proposition 3, in that
region a higher q or v2 reduces the incentive misalignment between the managers and the firm,
while a higher c widens it. The former effect reduces the firm’s profit losses, whereas the latter
increases it. Similarly, if the firm gathers more information than under the first-best policy, i.e.,
the firm over-invests in product evaluation (region CED), then the social value of this additional
information gain increases as the information precision becomes higher and the evaluation costs
lower.
6 Conclusions
This paper aims at understanding a key concern of many senior R&D executives: “how do
you make good decisions when the information you need to make those decisions comes largely
from the project champions who are competing against one another for resources” (Sharpe and
Keelin, 1998, p. 45). Prior academic literature has extensively discussed the importance of such
a question when managing parallel projects (e.g., Loch et al., 2006), but without offering explicit
guidance on how to structure appropriate incentive mechanisms that address these challenges.
This is also highlighted in Lerner (2012, p. 170) who emphasizes that “one crucial, though often
neglected, point is that such tolerance for failure requires a rethinking not just of compensation
schemes, but also of how projects are selected and funded. [. . . ] A question that would reward
both further research by economic theorists and real-world exploration is how to induce ’truth-
telling’ when evaluating high-risk innovative projects”. The main goal of this paper is to offer
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a formal framework on the tradeoffs involved between incentivizing information acquisition
and truthful revelation among new product development teams. More specifically, our study
makes the following contributions in the extant literature and suggests a set of corresponding
hypotheses for empirical validation.
First, we show that products characterized by different levels of precision in their evaluation
processes, require incentives of fundamentally different structure. For example, in the pharma-
ceutical industry new compounds are classified either as “new molecular entities” (NME) or
as “me-too” drugs. In the former case, due to the highly novel structure of the compound,
the results of even the most rigorous evaluation methods are “extremely sensitive”, and cannot
provide accurate information regarding the potential of the drug. On the contrary, in the latter
case, because “the mechanisms of action” are well-understood, a thorough evaluation process
can lead to highly precise estimations. The key managerial implication from our analysis, is
that those two different types of drugs, require completely different types of incentives: “me-
too” drugs require an emphasis on individual incentives whereas NMEs require an emphasis on
shared incentives. Thus, companies with a “one size fits all” approach in their incentive schemes
(similar to the ones we discussed in our motivating examples), will invariably over-emphasize
one aspect of the evaluation process at the expense of the other.
Hypothesis 1. Products for which the evaluation process is less (more) predictive of their
success are associated with a stronger emphasis on shared (individual) rather than individual
(shared) incentives.
Second, our model illustrates how the incentive misalignment within an organization can
severely hinder its product evaluation processes. To circumvent these inefficiencies, companies
often decide to outsource their evaluation processes to external providers, e.g., in the pharma-
ceutical industry such companies are called Contract Research Organizations (CRO). Intuitively,
an outsourcing strategy is optimal when a product’s evaluation does not require knowledge that
can only be found in-house, that is, when the expertise of an external provider is comparable
to the internal expertise. An example of such evaluation processes are Phase III clinical trials
that aim to prove that the efficacy of a drug is “statistically significant”. These evaluation
processes are rather standardized, with clear criteria and regulated performance thresholds.
On the contrary, during Phase II trials, what comprises sufficiently good or bad evidence for
the progression of a compound may depend on company-specific expertise and characteristics.
Moreover, we show that the presence of asymmetric information may significantly lower the
threshold regarding the minimum precision of an external provider, particularly so, when the
cost of information acquisition is high. In those regions, senior management should aim to re-
duce the extent of asymmetric information (by perhaps facilitating better communication and
coordination mechanisms), and therefore, make the in-house evaluation the optimal strategy
rather than relying on outsourcing.
Hypothesis 2. A firm is more likely to outsource its product evaluation when the external
provider’s level of expertise is closer to its own.
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Hypothesis 3. A firm is more likely to outsource the evaluation process for products for which
the internal evaluation process cannot be monitored.
Lastly, our analysis highlights the role of asymmetric information on the firm’s product
portfolio scope. In particular, we find that, compared to the first-best benchmark, too many
products are funded, leading to many failures and inefficient use of the firm’s resources. These
high attrition rates and the corresponding low R&D productivity is a major concern for almost
all pharmaceutical companies. Recent research has empirically shown that more decentralized
firms tend to manufacture too many products, attributing the effect to the managers’ local
preferences which are not necessarily aligned with the firm’s strategy (Thomas, 2011). Our
paper offers an alternative explanation for such overly broad product portfolios: the presence of
asymmetric information during the product evaluation stage. The key managerial implication
from this result is that any effort to reduce the extent of this information asymmetry, and
particularly the moral hazard component, can play a key role in improving the firm’s product
portfolio. Several firms in the pharmaceutical industry have attempted to make the product
evaluation process more transparent by removing the barriers of the functional silos and replace
them with highly integrated centers that focus on specific therapeutic areas. According to a
recent study of eight big pharmaceutical companies, those companies outperformed competitors
across several performance metrics of R&D productivity due to the “strong interfaces between
the research and the development unit” (Held et al., 2009, p. 106).
Hypothesis 4. Firms with evaluation processes characterized by high levels of asymmetric
information are more likely to have an overly broad product portfolio scope.
In order to maintain tractability and develop a parsimonious model, we have made some
assumptions regarding the role of product managers, and correspondingly, the specific functional
forms of the incentive structure. Specifically, our paper focuses on the project selection stage of
NPD, and as such, on the evaluation rather than the generation of different alternatives (e.g.,
higher effort in our setting improves the selection process but not the quality of the different
alternatives). Recent work has offered important insights on the structure of the opportunity
spaces (Kornish and Ulrich, 2011) as well as on the effect of asymmetric information on the
search process itself (Mihm et al., 2010). Moreover, our analysis considers ex-ante symmetric
projects. In practice, firms are often faced with projects that vary significantly with respect
to their state of execution, uncertainty, and need for resources. While our model captures
some first-order effects regarding the interplay between information acquisition and resource
allocation, we believe that capturing tradeoffs among projects that evolve over time is a fruitful
avenue for future research.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The firm’s optimal resource allocation for each realization of e and m max-
imizes the expected market value of both products, Eθ[νi + νj |m, e], with the expectation taken
over the products’ market potential. The proof now proceeds by comparing the expected mar-
ket value, Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] =
∑
i Pr(θi = G|mi, ei)νi(θi = G) + Pr(θi = B|mi, ei)νi(θi = B),
of different resource allocation schemes for all e and m, given that managers truthfully reveal
their signals, m = s.
Suppose e = (l, l). Then, Pr(θi = G|mi, ei = l) = 1/2 for any m. If the firm invests all its
resources in a single product, then Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = (v2 + z2)/2. If, in contrast, the firm splits
resources evenly, then Eθ[νi|m, e] = (v1 + z1)/2, yielding Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = v1 + z1. Since by
assumption v2 < 2v1 and z2 < 2z1, the firm’s optimal resource allocation for e = (l, l) and any
m is to split resources evenly.
Now, suppose e = (h, h). In this setting, Pr(θi = G|mi = g, ei = h) = q and Pr(θi =
G|mi = b, ei = h) = 1− q. Assume mi = mj , implying that posterior beliefs for both products
are also identical. As such, the firm maximizes the expected market value of both products
by splitting resources evenly. Now, assume m = (g, b). Allocating all resources to product i
gives Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = qv2 + (1− q)z2, while after an even split of resources Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] =
q(v1 + z1) + (1− q)(v1 + z1) = v1 + z1. It follows that the firm optimally allocates all resources
to product i if q > (v1 + z1 − z2)/(v2 − z2) = q0, and splits resources evenly otherwise.
Lastly, suppose e = (h, l). As the recommendation for product j is uninformative, the firm
allocates resources only based on the recommendation for product i. If the firm receives a good
recommendation for product i, then allocating all resources to product i yields Eθ[νi+νj |m, e] =
qv2 +(1−q)z2. Splitting resources evenly, however, results in Eθ[νi+νj |m, e] = qv1 +v1/2+(1−
q)z1 + z1/2. Thus, it is optimal for the firm to split resources evenly only if q < qg, and allocate
all resources to product i otherwise. Now, suppose the recommendation for product i is bad.
Then, it is never optimal to allocate both resources to product i. An even split of resources
yields Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = (1− q)v1 + v1/2 + qz1 + z1/2, whereas Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = (v2 + z2)/2 if
all resources are allocated to product j. Hence, the firm optimally splits resources evenly only
if q < qb, and allocates all resources to product j otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove this proposition in three steps: First, we derive the firm’s
first-best expected profit for any possible product evaluation strategy. Second, we establish
that the firm never chooses an asymmetric evaluation strategy if q < qg. Lastly, we discuss the
threshold functions ζ1, ζ2, and ζ3.
Profit derivation: If e = (l, l), the firm eventually splits its resources evenly across the two





G|si)Pr(si)v1 +Pr(θi = B|si)Pr(si)z1 = v1+z12 . Due to the symmetry of products and since no
evaluation costs are incurred, the firm’s ex-ante expected profit becomes
ΠFB(e = (l, l)) = v1 + z1. (1)
In contrast, for e = (h, h), the firm incurs evaluation costs for both products, but also
revises its initial beliefs about the true market potential of the two products. If q ≤ q0, then the
firm always splits resources evenly, and following (1), expected profits are v1 +z1−2c, which can
never be optimal. In contrast, if q > q0, the firm may either split resources evenly if products
are equally promising, or it may fund only one of the products. Therefore, Eθ[νi|e = (h, h)] =
1
4(qv2 + v1 + (1− q)z2 + z1), and consequently,
ΠFB(e = (h, h)) =
1
2
(qv2 + v1 + (1− q)z2 + z1)− 2c. (2)
Lastly, for e = (h, l), the derivation of the firm’s ex-ante expected profit is similar to the
above cases. However, we need to consider that the optimal resource allocation changes with q
(see Lemma 1). Thus,
ΠFB(e = (h, l)) =

v1 + z1 − c if q < qb
1
4(v2 + (2q + 1)v1 + z2 + (3− 2q)z1)− c if qb ≤ q < qg
1
4((2q + 1)v2 + (3− 2q)z2)− c if q ≥ qg.
(3)
Asymmetric evaluation: We now show that, in optimum, the firm never chooses e = (h, l) if
q < qg. First, for q < qb, Π
FB(e = (h, l)) = v1 +z1− c < v1 +z1 = ΠFB(e = (l, l)) because c > 0
by assumption. Second, e = (h, l) is also dominated for qb ≤ q < qg, i.e., ΠFB(e = (h, l)) >
max{ΠFB(e = (l, l)),ΠFB(e = (h, h))} is a contradiction. In fact, ΠFB(e = (h, l)) > ΠFB(e =
(h, h)) if and only if c > (2q− 1)[v2− v1− z2 + z1]/4 ≡ c; and ΠFB(e = (h, l)) > ΠFB(e = (l, l))
if and only if c < [v2 + (2q − 3)v1 + z2 − (2q + 1)z1]/4 ≡ c. However, c < c, which yields the
desired contradiction.
Optimal product evaluation: The threshold functions ζ1, ζ2, and ζ3 are derived by pairwise
comparing (1) with (2), (2) with (3), and (1) with (3), respectively. Accordingly, the firm
chooses e = (h, h) if c ≤ min{ζ1, ζ2}, e = (h, l) if ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3, and e = (l, l) if c > max{ζ1, ζ3}.
By noting that qc ≥ qg if and only if qc ≤ 1, we conclude: (i) If q < qc, then ζ3 < ζ1 < ζ2. Thus,
eFB = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ1, and eFB = (l, l) otherwise. (ii) If q ≥ qc, then ζ2 < ζ1 < ζ3. Thus,
eFB = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ2, eFB = (h, l) for ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3, and eFB = (l, l) otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we revisit the firm’s optimal resource
allocation. Second, we show that a compensation scheme that induces asymmetric effort levels
is never incentive compatible in effort.
Resource allocation: If both managers are truth-telling, but pursue different evaluation
effort levels, then the firm is not able to observe the managers’ product evaluation strategy. In
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fact, the firm does not know whether e = (h, l) or e = (l, h). This ambiguity has to be taken
into account when allocating resources to products (Lemma 1 is not straightforward applicable
because e is not known).
Suppose mi = mj . If recommendations are good, then Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = qv1 + (1− q)z1 +
(v1 + z1)/2 if the firm splits resources evenly, while allocating all resources to one product gives
Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = (qv2 + (1 − q)z2 + (v2 + z2)/2)/2. Similarly, if both recommendations are
bad, then an even split of resources yields Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = (1− q)v1 + qz1 + (v1 + z1)/2, while
allocating all resources to one product gives Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] = ((1− q)v2 + qz2 + (v2 + z2)/2)/2.
Thus, it is optimal to split resources evenly across products if recommendations are identical.
Now, assume m = (g, b). Allocating all resources to product i gives Eθ[νi + νj |m, e] =
(qv2+(1−q)z2+(v2+z2/2)/2, whereas splitting resources evenly yields Eθ[νi+νj |m, e] = v1+z1.
Therefore, the firm invests all resources in product i if q ≥ (4v1 − v2 + 4z1 − 3z2)/2(v2 − z2),
and splits resources evenly otherwise.
Incentive compatibility: By using the firm’s optimal resource allocation, we conclude this
proof by showing that any truth-telling contract with ei 6= ej is never incentive compatible in
effort, i.e., one manager always wants to deviate from his current effort level, such that ei 6= ej
cannot be part of any equilibrium.
If q < (4v1− v2 + 4z1− 3z2)/2(v2− z2), then the firm always allocates resources equally to
both products. Hence, exerting high-effort product evaluation is costly for a manager, but does
not affect the firm’s allocation decision. Therefore, each manager’s expected utility is always
largest under low-effort product evaluation.
If q ≥ (4v1−v2+4z1−3z2)/2(v2−z2), then the firm allocates all resources to a single product
if recommendations are unequal, and splits resources evenly elsewise. Without loss of generality,
assume e = (h, l), and suppose that a truth-telling contract exists. Then, this contract must
be incentive compatible in effort, i.e., Ui(ei = h|ej = l,m = s) ≥ Ui(ei = l|ej = l,m = s), and
Uj(ej = h|ei = h,m = s) < Uj(ej = l|ei = h,m = s). Manager i’s effort incentive compatibility
condition is satisfied if 2ks(qv2 + (1− q)z2)− 8c ≥ ks(v2 + z2), while manager j’s constraint is
true if 2ks(qv2 + (1− q)z2)− 8c < ks(v2 + z2). Since the two constraints contradict each other,
we conclude that there exists no symmetric contract that induces asymmetric effort levels.
Proof of Lemma 3. This proof consists of two steps. As a first step, we derive the firm’s op-
timization problem (P) - (LL). Step two determines the optimal wage contract that induces
high-effort product evaluation under public signals.
Optimization problem: The firm’s expected profit (P) is similar to (2). However, the firm
does not directly incur the effort costs c, but it has to incentivize its managers to exert high
effort by paying a bonus scheme k = (k0, ks, kp). Thus, the firm maximizes its expected profits,
Π(k) = (1−ks−kp)Eθ[νi+νj |k]−2k0 = (1−ks−kp)12(qv2+v1+(1−q)z2+z1)−2k0. We now turn to
the truth-telling constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b). Manager i truthfully reveals a good signal if and
only if Ui(mi = g|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) ≥ Ui(mi = b|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj), where
the manager assumes that the firm will optimally allocate resources according to the managers’
recommendations. Similarly, truthful revelation of a bad evaluation outcome is guaranteed if
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and only if Ui(mi = b|si = b, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) ≥ Ui(mi = g|si = b, ei = ej = h,mj = sj).
The required utilities are derived as follows: Ui(mi = g|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) =
P(sj = g)
(
k0 + ksEθi [νi|k,m, e] + kpEθj [νj |k,m, e]
)
+P(sj = b) (k0 + ksEθi [νi|k,m, e]) = 12(ks +
kp)(qv1+(1−q)z1)+ 12ks(qv2+(1−q)z2)+k0. Similarly, Ui(mi = b|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) =
1
2kp(qv2 + (1− q)z2) + 12 (ks(qv1 + (1− q)z1) + kp((1− q)v1 + qz1)) + k0, Ui(mi = g|si = b, ei =
ej = h,mj = sj) =
1
2 (ks((1− q)v1 + qz1) + kp(qv1 + (1− q)z1))+ 12ks((1− q)v2 + qz2)+k0, and
Ui(mi = b|si = b, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) = 12kp(qv2 + (1− q)z2) + 12(ks+kp)((1− q)v1 + qz1) +k0.
Canceling out identical terms gives the desired truth-telling conditions (IC-g) and (IC-b). In
a next step, we analyze the firm’s effort incentive condition (IC-e). Manager i exerts high-
effort product evaluation if and only if Ui(ei = h|ej = h,m = s) ≥ Ui(ei = l|ej = h,m = s),
where the manager assumes that the firm will optimally allocate resources according to the
managers’ recommendations, and that recommendations are truthful. These utilities are given
by: Ui(ei = h|ej = h,m = s) = P(si = g, sj = g)
(
k0 + ksEθi [νi|k,m, e] + kpEθj [νj |k,m, e]
)
+
P(si = g, sj = b) (k0 + ksEθi [νi|k,m, e]) + P(si = b, sj = g)
(
k0 + kpEθj [νj |k,m, e]
)
+ P(si =
b, sj = b)
(
k0 + ksEθi [νi|k,m, e] + kpEθj [νj |k,m, e]
)− c = 14(ks+kp)(qv1 +(1− q)z1)+ 14ks(qv2 +
(1 − q)z2) + 14kp(qv2 + (1 − q)z2) + 14(ks + kp)((1 − q)v1 + qz1) + k0 − c, and Ui(ei = l|ej =








2(v2 + z2) +
1






2(v1 + z1) + kp((1− q)v1 + qz1)
)
+ k0. Collecting terms yields the firm’s effort incentive
constraint (IC-e). Lastly, the firm needs to ensure that wages are always non-negative, since
managers are protected by limited liability. By 2z1 ≥ z2, a manager’s minimum wage is either
k0 + kpz2 or k0 + ksz2, which results in the limited liability constraints (LL).
Optimal contract: With public signals, the firm does not need to incentivize truth-telling
by the managers. As a result, the firm can induce high-effort product evaluation by offering a
contract that satisfies (IC-e), while adhering to the managers’ limited liability constraints (LL).
From (IC-e), it follows immediately that ks ≥ 8c(2q−1)(v2−z2) . It remains to optimally choose k0
and kp such that (LL) is satisfied.
Firstly, suppose kp ≤ ks. Then, (LL) implies k0 = −kpz2. For brevity, define V ≡
1
2(qv2 + v1 + (1 − q)z2 + z1). Inserting this into the firm’s profit function (P) gives Π(k) =
(1 − ks − kp)V + 2kpz2. For q ≥ qd, we have V − 2z2 ≥ 0. In this situation, Π(k) decreases in
ks and kp, implying that the firm chooses ks and kp as low as possible, i.e., ks =
8c
(2q−1)(v2−z2)
and kp = 0. For q < qd, we have V − 2z2 < 0. In this situation, Π(k) decreases in ks, but
increases in kp. Thus, the firm chooses kp as high as possible. Given ks ≥ kp, this implies
kp = ks, i.e., both limited liability constraints (LL) are binding. Inserting kp = ks into Π(k)




Lastly, suppose that in the optimal contract ks < kp. Then, the binding limited liability
constraint is k0 +ksz2 ≥ 0, implying k0 = −ksz2 in optimum. In this case, Π(k) decreases in kp.
Thus, for any ks that the firm chooses, the firm can always increase its profits by lowering kp,
while always maintaining incentive compatibility ((IC-e) does not depend on kp). Thus, ks < kp
can never be optimal.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Note that in any optimal contract, (IC-g) can never be binding because
the firm could reduce bonuses without affecting the managers’ effort and truth-telling decision.
The same argument implies that (at least) one of the limited liability constraints (LL) must be
binding.
Firstly, suppose that in the optimal contract ks ≥ kp. Then, the binding limited liability
constraint is k0 + kpz2 ≥ 0, implying k0 = −kpz2 in optimum. Inserting k0 in the firm’s profit
function (P) gives Π(k) = (1− ks− kp)V + 2kpz2 = V − ksV − kp(V − 2z2). For q ≥ qd, we have
V − 2z2 ≥ 0. In this situation, Π(k) decreases in ks and kp, implying that the firm chooses ks





q(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1+(1−q)(z2−z1)+qz1 ·ks. For q < qd, we have V −2z2 < 0. In this situation,
Π(k) decreases in ks, but increases in kp. Thus, the firm chooses kp as high as possible. Given
ks ≥ kp, this implies kp = ks, i.e., both limited liability constraints (LL) are binding. Inserting
kp = ks into Π(k) yields Π(k) = V − 2ks(V − z2). Since V − z2 > 0, ks is chosen as low as
possible; i.e., by (IC-e), ks =
8c
(2q−1)(v2−z2) . Lastly, the firm never chooses ks < kp by the same
argument as in Lemma 3.
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose q ≥ qd. To show that k∗s > k∗p, it is sufficient to verify that
(1−q)v2+qz2
q(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1+(1−q)(z2−z1)+qz1 < 1. Rearranging this inequality and solving for q assures
that the condition holds for any q > 1/2. To show that k∗p/k∗s decreases concavely in q, con-




= (1−q)v2+qz2q(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1+(1−q)(z2−z1)+qz1 with respect to q, v2, and c, respectively. It




























= −2qq(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1+(1−q)(z2−z1)+qz1 · ∂∂v2
k∗p
k∗s
> 0, which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 3. The manager: The contract scheme k∗ incentivizes each manager to
exert high-effort product evaluation. Thus, each manager’s expected utility is given by Ui(k
∗) =
E[wi(k∗)]− c. Since, ex-ante, both products have the same expected market value, Eθ(νi|k∗) =
(qv2 + v1 + (1 − q)z2 + z1)/4 = V/2, manager i’s expected wage is E[wi(k∗)] = k∗0 + (k∗s +
k∗p)Eθ(νi|k∗) = k∗0 + (k∗s + k∗p)V/2.
First, we show that E[wi(k∗)] decreases in q. Note that ∂k
∗
s
∂q = − 22q−1k∗s , and ∂V∂q = 12(v2−z2).













∂q (V − 2z2) + k∗p ∂V∂q
]
< 0. Because the third term is negative, it suffices





















s(v2 − z2) <
2V k∗s ≤ 22q−1V k∗s = −∂k
∗
s




∂q (V −z2)+k∗s ∂V∂q =
− 22q−1k∗s(V − z2) + k∗s ∂V∂q < 0, because 4(V − z2) > v2 − z2.




= − 1v2−z2k∗s , and ∂V∂v2 = 12q.















(V − 2z2) + k∗p ∂V∂v2
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(V − z2) + k∗s ∂V∂v2 = − 1v2−z2k∗s(V − z2) + k∗s
q







Lastly, we show that Ui(k
∗) increases linearly in c. Assume q ≥ qd. In this case, differ-
entiating Ui(k













− 1 > 12 ∂k
∗
s
















− 1 > 1.
The firm: The firm’s expected profit is given by (P) and can be rewritten as Π(k∗) =
2 · [Eθ(νi|k∗)− E[wi(k∗)]]. From the previous proof, we know that E[wi(k∗)] decreases in q and
v2, and increases in c, whereas Eθ(νi|k∗) increases in q and v2, and is invariant in c. Thus, it
follows immediately that Π(k∗) increases in q and v2, and decreases in c.
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting k∗0, k∗s , and k∗p into (P) and comparing expected profits






) . Since (2q−1)(v2−z2) <
4V and (2q − 1)(v2 − z2) < 8(V − z2), it follows ζ4 < ζ1. Next, by example, we prove the claim
that there exist parameter values such that ζ4 > ζ2. Assume q = 1, v1 = 10, v2 = 19, z1 = 1,
and z2 = 1.5. Then, ζ4 = 0.521 > 0.375 = ζ2, which establishes the result. Finally, we note
that ζ4 is convex increasing in q.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Let Πout =
1
2(qoutv2 + v1 + (1 − qout)z2 + z1) − 2cout be the firm’s
expected profit under outsourcing. The firm prefers an in-house product evaluation if and only
if Π(c, q) ≥ Πout. From the Implicit Function Theorem, we know that there exists a unique
threshold function, q(c), such that Π(c, q(c)) = Πout. Since Π(c, q) increases in q, it follows that
an in-house product evaluation is optimal if and only if q ≥ q(c).
(ii)-(iii) The ordering of the threshold functions, q(c) ≥ qMH(c) > qAS(c) = qFB(c), follows
from Propositions 1 and 2 together with Lemma 3. Using implicit differentiation and the results





∂c∂q · ∂Π∂c /(∂Π∂q )2 ≤ 0 if and
only if ∂
2Π
∂c∂q ≥ 0, what we verify in the remainder. Note that Γ ≡ 4(V − z2)− 2(2q − 1)∂V∂q > 0.














∂c · Γ > 0.
With pure moral hazard, for q ≥ qd, ∂2Π∂c∂q = 12(2q−1) · ∂k
∗
s
∂c · Γ > 0. With pure adverse selection
the firm can realize first-best profits and ∂
2ΠFB
∂c∂q = 0.















v2−z2 . For q ≥ qd, let cmax =
q−1(1). Then, ∂q(cmax)∂c >
4





Proof of Proposition 6. To prove the claim, we note the following: (i) If e = (l, l), then n =
nFB = 2; (ii) if e = (h, l), then nFB = 1; and (iii) if e = (h, h), then n = nFB = 1.5. Combining
this observation with Propositions 1 and 4 concludes the proof: For q < qc, n − nFB = 0.5 if
ζ4 ≤ c ≤ ζ1, and 0 otherwise; for q ≥ qc, n − nFB = 0.5 if min{ζ2, ζ4} ≤ c < max{ζ2, ζ4}, 1 if
max{ζ2, ζ4} ≤ c ≤ ζ3, and 0 otherwise.
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Proof of Proposition 7. We begin with investigating ηp for all five regions indicated in Figure 4.





> 0. It can be
readily verified that the second fraction is equal to one, and by applying Proposition 3, the first
fraction increases in q and v2, and decreases in c. It follows immediately that ηp decreases in q
and v2, and increases in c. (ii) e
fb = e∗ = (l, l): In this case, ηp = 1− v1+z1v1+z1 = 0. (iii) efb = (h, h),
e∗ = (l, l): In this case, ηp = 1 − v1+z11
2
(qv2+v1+(1−q)z2+z1)−2c > 0, which increases in q and v2, and
decreases in c. (iv) efb = (h, l), e∗ = (l, l): In this case, ηp = 1 − v1+z11
4
((2q+1)v2+(3−2q)z2)−c > 0,
which increases in q and v2, and decreases in c. (v) e
fb = (h, l), e∗ = (h, h): In this case,





> 0. As already argued in case (i), the first
fraction increases in q and v2, and decreases in c. Now, by noting that over-investment can only
occur if c > ζ2, we can readily verify that the same is true for the second fraction. Thus, ηp
decreases in q and v2, and increases in c. Finally, we note that the firm under-invests in product
evaluation in cases (iii) and (iv), while an over-investment occurs solely in case (v).
We now turn to ηw. If e
∗ = efb, then Π(e∗) + Ui(e∗) + Uj(e∗) = Πfb(efb), and ηw = 0.
If the firm over-invests in product evaluation, e∗ = (h, h) and efb = (h, l), then ηw = 1 −
Π(e∗)+Ui(e∗)+Uj(e∗)
Πfb(efb)
> 0 decreases in q and v2, and increases in c by the argument given in (v).
Lastly, if the firm under-invests in product evaluation, e∗ = (l, l), compared to the first-best case,
efb = (h, h) or efb = (h, l), then the percentage welfare loss, ηw = 1− v1+z11
2
(qv2+v1+(1−q)z2+z1)−2c > 0
or ηw = 1− v1+z11
4
((2q+1)v2+(3−2q)z2)−c > 0, increases in q and v2, and decreases in c.
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